Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann strikes again. In a tribune on today’s Financial Times he argues that to break the sovereign-bank nexus, the only solution is to impose, through regulation, an extra burden on sovereign debt holdings (he is gracious enough to concede that a transition period could be accorded).
I find this fascinating. Germany is the country that most opposes a fully fledged banking Union, that to be effective would require common deposit insurance, a crisis resolution mechanism, and I would add, an enhanced role of the ECB as a lender of last resort.
This would break the vicious circle between sovereigns and the financial sector, without denying the special role of banks and credit in a modern economy; nor, also relevant in today’s situation, their capacity to finance governments. Weidmann stubbornly refuses to see any specificity to banks, and has nothing else to propose than imposing by regulation what de facto is a downgrading by default of sovereign debt.
Mr Weidmann is a talented economist. He should maybe go back to Bagehot’s Lombard Street
What to do of yesterday’s decision of the ECB? The tree looks
very rather nice, the forest much less. First, a look at what Mario Draghi announced:
- “[...] the Governing Council today decided on the modalities for undertaking Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in secondary markets for sovereign bonds in the euro area. [...] We aim to preserve the singleness of our monetary policy and to ensure the proper transmission of our policy stance to the real economy throughout the area. OMTs will enable us to address severe distortions in government bond markets which originate from, in particular, unfounded fears on the part of investors of the reversibility of the euro. [...] we act strictly within our mandate to maintain price stability over the medium term.” The technical note accompanying the decision explicitly states what markets wanted to know: “No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions” In other words, bond purchases will be unlimited.The technical note also specifies the conditionality, the fact that the purchases will be on short maturities, and that they will be fully sterilized.
- Let’s go back to Draghi: “we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. [...] inflation rates are expected to remain above 2% throughout 2012, to fall below that level again in the course of next year and to remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon.“
To summarize, the ECB will try to bring down the spreads, acting within its mandate, because speculation is perturbing the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and threatening stability. This can also help explain the decision to keep the rates unchanged: there is no point in using that lever, unless it is sure it works.
Why is the tree rather good? And what makes the forest more worrisome? The tree first.
So, we had another crucial summit, on June 28-29, followed by another also crucial Eurogroup, on July 9. Like all the ones that preceded, and the ones that will follow, they were trumpeted as the final solution to eurozone woes. And as usual, these “final solutions” lasted days, if not hours.
I was tempted to comment immediately after, but I wanted to see the dust settle for once, so as to have more perspective. Did not work that way, though, as news kept piling up. But let’s look at what was agreed.
Istat, the Italian statistical office, just released its Quarterly non-financial accounts for the General Government. As were to be expected, deficit is spiraling out of control (8% on the first quarter, against 7% in 2011), because of higher borrowing costs, and because the economy is doing very poorly.
Two days ago they released the provisional unemployment figures for May: stable above 10% (youth unemployment is at 36.2%!).
It seems that we come full circle, robustly installed in a Recession-Deficit-Austerity-Recession-Deficit-and-so-on spiral.
Austerity works, right? Why on earth, should Italy aim for a balanced budget in 2013? Is this required by current European rules? No(t yet). Is this reassuring markets? No. Is this boosting private expenditure? No. Is this killing the Italian economy? Yes.
Ah, and if at least we did something for those spreads…
I really enjoyed this piece by Perry Mehrling on the lethal embrace between sovereign debt and banks, and on how to dissolve it. Alex Barker and George Parker on the Financial Times seem to think that the only way to have a banking union is to have a fiscal union (which makes the proposal impossible to implement). Mehrling disagrees, and explains how this could be done.
I am no expert in finance, but he seems rather convincing. And for once, here is a proposal that does not call for a grand solution (unfortunately, very unlikely), but for a step-by-step process.
Also, i really enjoy reading what happens at INET (yes, this is called advertising).
Larry Summers has a very interesting piece on yesterday’s Financial Times.
He argues that a few countries (the US, Germany, Japan, the UK; I would also add France) enjoy extremely low borrowing rates, both short and long run. In particular, real rates (nominal rate minus inflation) are negative or zero for maturities up to 5 years, and extremely low for longer ones. Summers’ conclusions are then straightforward:
- Focusing on further quantitative easing is not particularly useful; given the already very low rates, further reductions are unlikely to trigger private spending (it has a name: liquidity trap. And Paul Krugman has been insisting a lot on this, for example here)
- More importantly, government should borrow now, like crazy, taking advantage of the favorable conditions to reinforce their long term fiscal sustainability. This is what any reasonable CEO would do, and there is no reason why governments should act differently.
Summers makes a point that is almost obvious: Any project that has positive expected return would improve the country’s fiscal position, if financed with debt at negative real rates: This is the time for example to borrow to buy government buildings that are currently leased. Or to accelerate the rate of replacement of aging capital; or again, to engage in long term infrastructure building/renovation. Makes sense, right? It makes so much sense, that chances are that it will not be done…
I would like to add two considerations. The first is to stress that to get private demand started, it is important that growth perspectives are stronger. Firms today do not invest, not because of borrowing costs, but because even at very low interest rates, expected demand is so low that investment is not profitable. The second is that, for Europe, increased borrowing in Germany, France and the UK would be crucial. Countries enjoying low rates could not only significantly improve their long term prospects, as Summers argues. They could also sustain demand in countries that are consolidating, thus favoring the rebalancing I have repeatedly argued for.
I am preparing a class on the crisis, and for the first time I have put together in a single place the actual numbers that I discussed sparsely in the past. Taken all together, they are even scarier. So scary, that I want to share them.
My colleague Sezgin Polat, of Galatasaray University, has an interesting idea on wages and the burden of the crisis. All the more interesting, that just yesterday the ECB called for further wage flexibility, at a moment in which aggregate demand is despairingly low in the eurozone. Here is Sezgin’s proposal (I shortened it):
The European Council meeting, next Monday, should finally lift the veil of mystery that has surrounded the new “fiscal compact”, the set of rules supposed to govern fiscal policy in EU member countries. As of now, the only official document in our hands is the Statement approved by the Heads of State and Government at the December 9 meeting.
I have argued at length that I am not in the camp of those who believe fiscal profligacy is the source of EMU problems (recently, here and here). Rather the contrary, I always thought (see for example here and here) that even the current rules de facto prevented EMU countries from effectively using the standard tools of macroeconomic policy.